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ARTICLES

REVIEWS OF CURRENT BOOKS

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CATHOLIC SECTARIANISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SO-CALLED BOSTON HERESY CASE

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The present paper is based upon a study made several years ago of the so-called Boston Heresy Case. The incident was unusual inasmuch as an important case of heresy in the American Catholic Church had not occurred for a very long time. The substance of the study was completed before the group found itself in conflict with ecclesiastical authority, and at a time when the members themselves and the non-Catholics who knew them considered their position orthodox and even "official." The study predicted the likelihood of excommunication though at the time it appeared that ecclesiastical authority was largely, if not completely, unaware of the true significance of this interesting religious development in one of the most Catholic regions of America. (The author's study is in the Social Relations Library, Harvard University, under the title "Catholic Ideology and Secular Pressures.")

Strains Inherent in the Contemporary Position of the Catholic Church

Social institutions embody a fundamental dilemma providing as they do both the established context requisite for human behavior and at the same time embodying restrictions upon the thinking and action of individuals. The former aspect is required for and is the basis of stable and continuing human activity, but the latter can prove itself an inhibiting force with respect to creativity and spontaneity, and can in some situations contribute a certain rigidity and defensiveness in the face of the challenge which new developments in the on-going life of the society present to individuals and groups.

Nowhere is this dilemma so apparent as in organized religion. The reasons for this derive from two sources. First, the religious experience is the experience of ultimacy and the sacred, both of which transcend established social forms and place individuals at the limit- or boundary-situation in terms of cognition of and the affective response to the human situation apperceived in that modality. Second, the religious institutions are, in our civilization, old institutions displaying that autonomy of individual wishes and motivation characteristic of established social forms in a particularly severe form.

Moreover, the religions of the Judeo-Christian tradition, emphasizing as they do the importance of man's relation to the transcendent, are placed in the position where they cannot readily (or over any long period of time, successfully) simply adapt to society. They must always embody an element of "relative disarticulation" with other social institutions and with the general run of consensual values in the society of which they are a part. In fact, when they are most true to their own visions they will be least at home in the "world," understood as the general context of secular values and conduct characteristic of their social settings. And contrariwise, when they fit best into that world, their position is always one in which they stand in danger of slighting or even partially betraying their insights into what is required for an appropriate response to their vision of the transcendent God. (A further development of this problem is contained in an article by the present author which will appear in the first issue of the *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* entitled "Five Dilemmas in the Institutionalization of Religion.")

It was this basic dilemma of Christianity which Troeltsch so remarkably spelled out in his great work, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, but it is a Christian dilemma which but continues in new forms the older paradox to be seen in the conflict among the Biblical Hebrews, between the royal and priestly versus the prophetic understanding of the special relation to transcendence which Israel conceived as its peculiar covenant. With the institutionalization of religion—whether in the national entity of Bibical Israel or the Christian community of the Church—this basic disarticulation undergoes a number of remarkable transformations. Social institutionalization represents the objectification and establishment of a certain relative autonomy for culture patterns which were originally the significant content of the minds and attitudes of remarkable men who underwent original religious experiences. Then the problems of adjusting values whose relation is characterized by a relative contrariety undergoes a metamorphosis into conflicts between social institutions, and all the secondary motivations of vested interests become built into them. For example,

the disarticulation between the response to ultimacy embodied in Christianity and secular values of an essentially penultimate nature (and which make up the greater part of the value-systems of all cultures) is transformed into a conflict between the Church as the institutional embodiment of the former and the secular community as the manifestation of the latter.

Modern Western civilization is the product of the Judeo-Christian religion on the one hand and the secularization process which was to a considerable degree a revolt against it on the other. There is a great historic irony in this since the Christian ages with their creationist theology prepared the way for an acceptance of secular values once the economic and social situation had brought into being the requisite classes for the assertion of their autonomy. Yet despite the undoubted truth of Tillich's statement that the Catholic Church was the schoolmistress of Europe until the fourteenth century, it is equally true that medieval Christianity slighted the legitimacy of secular values in practice, attempted to make a pseudomonastic ideal the model for the Christian lay life, and asserted an imperialist supremacy of the church in relation to other institutions of society. When it is recalled that this all took place within an institutionally hardening ecclesiastical structure and an explicit intellectualized world view which tended toward a certain rigidity of closure (despite the internal disarticulations it contained) it is not surprising that the modern world from the fourteenth century on found it necessary to revolt against the older Catholic structures and to proclaim secular values—science, nature, and politics. While this was characteristic of the Mediterranean world, the revolt in the north took another direction—the attempt to assert a partially de-institutionalized Christianity against the rigidity of Catholic structures in the realms of thought, worship, and ecclesiastical polity.

The Catholicism of the fourteenth century represented a compromise between the inner content of the Christian experience and the processes of institutionalization and their product, and between an Augustinian view of secular values and the new assertion of the legitimacy of the secular developing in Italy and elsewhere. Reinhold Niebuhr is quite right when he states that Catholicism was too humanistic for the north, too Christian for the south. It was, moreover, institutionally rigid and caught in the net of vested interests. Despite its impressive self-reform (which, however, came too late to prevent schism and revolt), it remained in the anomalous position of half-progenitor and half-alien in the modern world.

As a result of these developments, the relative disarticulation between Christianity and the world, which is the permanent condition and crisis of religions of transcendence, expresses itself in our day in a complete aliena-

tion of the modern temper from the Christian spirit. Catholics tend to see the former as characterized by the failure to center life on God. This condition of western thought and values is the result of a complex historical development which includes the rise of cities, trade, nations, worldly learning, and modern science. One specific aspect of the process has found particular expression in America—the utopian aspirations of a democratic and scientistic "chiliasm." Catholics are often protected by the structure of Catholic thought and institutional forms from feeling the full impact of this cultural context, and as a result Catholic life in America is often characterized by a number of strains the sources of which often remain obscure.

Although in the United States the secession of humanism and its bearers from the older orthodoxy was largely against a dominant Protestantism, the resulting antagonism and disarticulation were often directed against the Roman Catholic Church as the survival of medievalism, ecclesiasticism, superstition, and tyranny. This situation of disarticulation and defensiveness was made more difficult for American Catholicism by the fact that its members were largely immigrants who were being incorporated into American society at the lowest social level. A lower-class and largely immigrant Catholicism grew up segregated into something like a ghetto in the midst of a prospering and expanding society based upon secularism— more precisely upon scientism and capitalism. If, from one point of view, America was indeed a welcome haven to the immigrants, it also exacted a heavy price "down to the third and fourth generation" of those that loved her. The record of American Catholicism and of American Catholics as a group is one of assimilation with its conflicts and compromises, its successes and failures, its humor and pathos, and perhaps above all, its ambiguities. (A good recent work dealing with one aspect of this development is Cross, *The Emergence of Liberal Catholicism in America*.)

The fact is that the American Catholic is generally of humble lineage, of a background often relatively segregated from the main currents of American culture, and as a result, is often uneasy about his relation to important aspects of American culture when he is not downright defensive. His somewhat greater vulnerability to the appeals of a radicalism of the right must be seen in this light, for it is of central importance to understanding its structure and content.

Recent years have seen a considerable change in this condition with the remarkable social mobility of Catholics in politics and business, and even—though with significant lag—in intellectual life. Yet for American Catholics the general problems of social mobility have been complicated by the fact that non-Catholic intellectual circles which ultimately set the

tone of the culture, establishing the cultivated and civilized climates of opinion, were first Protestant and later secularist. (A similar situation of Christians in Europe is discussed by Heim in his *Christian Faith and Natural Science,* pp. 16ff.) Hence the American Catholic must often confront circles to whom he is not simply socially inferior, but also in terms of the self-definitions of such groups, intellectually and culturally inferior as well. As a student in a secular college he is immersed in an intellectual atmosphere which combines indifference and antagonism to his fundamental faith position. As an intellectual he must face the difficult task of reuniting the separation between his religion and secular learning and values which the centuries have produced—and often be misunderstood by his co-religionists who either do not see the vastness of the problem or react against the whole disturbing spectacle with a semisectarian defensiveness. It is small wonder that a few years ago, with the tendency for anti-Catholicism to become the anti-Semitism of the liberals, some Catholics embraced anti-intellectualism as the anti-secularism of those unable to meet the stringent demands of the modern encounter which assimilation and social mobility had thrust upon them. Since Communism is the most identifiable and most aggressive expression of secularist thought in our day, it is to be expected that there developed among Catholics a broad and uncritical anti-communism, which attacked all forms of secular liberalism.

The position of contemporary Catholicism then is characterized by two sets of strains. One arises from the defensive position of Christianity as a whole in the face of the modern civilization which developed in a condition of semisecession from its ranks. The second derives from the rigidity of overinstitutionalization which characterized and still characterizes Catholic thought and organization. Yet in terms of sociological analysis it cannot be denied that these two conditions have played a positive role in preserving the integrity of Catholic thought and institutions.

It would be a complete misreading of the record to conclude that modern Catholicism had failed to perceive its problems and to face the challenge to its present position. The present century has seen a veritable "Catholic renaissance" in thinking and in the renewal of the forms of worship. It remains true, however, that the repercussions of positive adaptive developments have been restrained within the context of institutional and intellectual rigidities.

Catholic thinking has indeed been unaware of the strains outlined above. The pressures of its present position push its members toward extreme responses the more they become aware of the true sociological and intellectual dimensions of their present position in modern society and culture. The late

Emmanuel Cardinal Suhard has analyzed the two phenomena known as integralism and modernism in Catholic circles as two errors evoked by the strains of secularization and charted for the French Church, which had been plagued by both, a middle way. These are in fact but less extreme expressions of reactions which in heightened form reveal themselves as sectarianism in one case and apostasy in the other.

This paper presents an abbreviated report of research in which both these extreme responses had originally been studied. It confines itself, however, to sectarianism. It is the great irony of the American Catholic experience that the immigration of a lower-class Church, defensive in the face of its partial alienation from the contemporary culture, rendered an entire ecclesiastical structure somewhat sectarian in its response to its cultural milieu, dominantly Protestant in its content. An extreme phenomenon, implicitly tantamount in Catholic terms to heresy and in this case actually ending as heretical, outright sectarianism reveals in exaggerated form aspects of response to strain often present in a less palpable way among the great majority who occupy more modal positions.

The St. Benedict Center

In 1940 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a Catholic student group was formed which became known as St. Benedict Center. Located within the shadow of Harvard University Houses and but a short walk from the Harvard Yard, the Center attracted Harvard students as well as others from the colleges and universities in Greater Boston. Its evening lectures often drew as many as 250 to 300 students. In 1946, in addition to student activities and lectures, the Center became a school, receiving students under the G.I. Bill and offering classes in Scripture, philosophy, church history, classical languages, and other subjects. In the same year, it began to publish a quarterly entitled *From the Housetops*. Its spiritual director was a Jesuit priest—a talented writer and able lecturer—who had been regarded in Catholic circles as a genial commentator.

During its development the Center came to identify its chief aim with opposition to secular education, which by the Fall of 1946 could be said to have constituted its *raison d'etre*. Its members, some of whom were Catholic students away from home, some commuters, some converts, were told by their leaders (some of whom were faculty members of Boston College) that the modern world was a place of great peril to their faith; they were counseled to meet it with a policy combining withdrawal and militant opposition. Lectures and articles in the quarterly put this policy into effect. Many non-Catholics came to the Center to see "what the noise was all about."

Many at Harvard considered the position of the Center to be the "official" position of the Catholic Church, and it became somewhat of a scandal.

Opposition to secular education was at first understood largely as opposition to secularism in education at secular colleges and universities. This was soon expanded to advocacy of Catholic withdrawal from such institutions, and to criticism, often of a distorted kind, of secularism in Catholic institutions and in the policies of Catholic educators. Opposition to Catholic students attending secular colleges grew into opposition to Catholic graduate students attending secular universities, and the superiors of religious orders for sending their members to do graduate work at secular universities. Ironically enough, the priests and nuns who came to Harvard for graduate work were often older than many of the self-appointed counselors at the Center.

The Center came to oppose any Catholic participation in interfaith cooperation and even to oppose friendly relations with Protestants. One began to detect a desire to draw as sharp a line of demarcation between Catholic and non-Catholic as possible. These tendencies and policies were finally summed up in an insistence upon a narrow and unequivocal interpretation of the dictum *extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*

These tendencies and policies revealed themselves as three themes, which sum up the basic attitudes of the Center group. These are documented from the contents of the ten issues from September 1946 to the spring of 1949 of *From the Housetops.*

1. *Opposition to secular education and to Catholic students attending secular colleges and universities.*

> Secularism in colleges is so complex a phenomenon that its nature and its modes of opposition to Catholic faith are hard to define. Catholics must nevertheless recognize it as their main enemy. . . . Any Catholic student choosing a secular college exposes himself to these dangers [Vol. I, No. 1].

> What they [Catholic students who enter secular colleges] desire is a liberal education; what they receive is instruction inevitably detrimental to their faith [Vol. I, No. 2].

> Never have so many Catholics gone to secular colleges. . . . In one more generation, will there be any Catholic loyalty left? [Vol. III, No. 1].

2. *Opposition to secular emphasis in Catholic education.*

A Plea for No Appeasement

1. To reestablish uncompromising orthodoxy. . . . .

2. We must know that not only is it against the Church for Catholic students to go to secular colleges, but it is a scandal for Catholic clergy to go there also.

3. We must break with State Boards of Education made up of heretical and atheistic men whose concept of man's nature is limited and whose view of men's destiny is utilitarian and humanistic, who rule that our college curricula resemble in content the courses taught in secular colleges.

4. We must not place on the faculty of Catholic Colleges secular college men except on recommendation of priests who will take responsibility for their orthodoxy. We should not place on the faculty of Catholic Colleges priests who have received the greater part of their training in secular colleges.

5. We must remove the prestige which has been given to schools of Social Work, Experimental Psychology, and Psychiatry based on the teaching of Sigmund Freud and his successors [Vol. I, No. 3].

The large enrollment of religious at every secular university in this country is a scandal both to Catholics and non-Catholics [Vol. I, No. 3].

3. *The attempt to draw a sharp line between Catholics and non-Catholics.*
. . . (Inter-faith cooperation means to) make terms with Christ's enemies [Vol. I, No. 3].

If we are to preserve our faith today we must know our enemies. The greatest enemy of the Catholic Church today is not Communism, as many suppose. It is heresy—Protestantism. . . . It requires courage to attack the real enemy, Protestantism. Still it must be done if we are to save our own souls and the souls of those Protestants of good will who would come into the Church if

a sufficiently strong challenge were presented and a sharp line drawn between the Church and its enemies.

And let us not be afraid of calling Protestants names. Nothing is so useful in removing surface cordiality. In this day of weakened faith name-calling is considered impolite. Very well, let it be so. Politeness is not one of the cardinal virtues [Vol. II, No. 4].

The file of *From the Housetops* contains ten issues, comprising 193 titles which fill 638 pages. Of these, 125 are prose titles, 68 are poetry. Of the former, 32 are more or less direct (most of them very direct) expressions of the three themes presented above. Thirteen more may be called philosophical articles; in some of these the three themes may be found but they are not the dominant content. The 32 articles which are more or less direct expressions of the dominant themes fill 149 pages out of a total of 638. Thus about one-quarter of the publication is devoted to these themes directly while other features often indirectly reflect them.

On the other hand there is striking unawareness of, or unconcern with, the general problems of the day. The magazine began publication one year after the end of World War II, yet the war is hardly ever mentioned except in poetry. There is no discussion of the moral problems raised by the atom bomb. Current problems in politics and economics are ignored. The magazine is directed to students yet there are no articles discussing problems in the humanities or sciences. While teaching in secular institutions or in Catholic colleges is attacked, there is no real attempt to discuss intellectual problems from the point of view of the Christian faith or to take up the concrete problems of Christian education. No Catholic work in any academic field is discussed. There is one book review in the whole two and a half years: Arnold Toynbee is called a trickster and a magician for his *A Study of History*. Only among the philosophical articles is there any recognition of modern problems as posing something other than targets for polemic.

Significant also is the general tone of the magazine imbued as it is with three striking characteristics: (1) a note of urgency, (2) distortion of the present situation of the Church in America, and (3) opposition to the policies of the Church in America.

Incipient Sectarianism and Legitimate Authority

The reaction of St. Benedict Center to secularism at a distinguished institution of learning was characterized by separatism and by both defi-

ance of and withdrawal from the demands of the secular sphere. The demands of the secular sphere in this instance included at minimum some serious attempt to confront secular learning and modern science in the spirit of the original patristic confrontation of classical learning: "For 'thy foot shall not stumble' if thou attribute to Providence all good, whether it belong to the Greeks or to us" (St. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I, v. 28), or of the medieval confrontation of Greek and Arabic science:: *"Non respecias a quo sed quod sane dicatur memoriae recommenda"* (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De modo studendi*). This task—not an easy one under the circumstances—would have required an equanimity which was rendered more difficult of achievement by the insecurity of a minority group in a climate of opinion varying from alien through uncongenial to hostile, the group itself occupying a position of social and intellectual inferiority. It is this condition which parallels the marginality characteristic of the circumstances in which so many Protestant sects have arisen. In some two and a half years of publication of *From the Housetops*, a period in which the Center was at its height as a Catholic student group, the quarterly shows no serious endeavor to meet this task. Polemical opposition is preferred, and Catholic intellectual and even social ghettoism is advocated. It is this reaction which parallels the reaction of separatism and exclusiveness which characterizes Protestant sectarianism. As in the Protestant examples, isolation was preferred not only to compromise but to entrance into the world even for the latter's sanctification.

All of these sectarian tendencies were summed up in a narrow, literalist, and unequivocal interpretation of *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, an interpretation which held "that the baptism of desire is a device of 'liberal' Catholics to christianize heretics," and displayed a spirit that "not only alienates Protestants of good faith but also is a positive scandal to Catholics" (Donnelly, "Some Observations on the Question of Salvation Outside the Church," Department of Theology, Boston College, n.d. (1949), privately distributed) The taking of an exclusivist stand upon this interpretation is somewhat analogous in Catholic circumstances to characteristics of Protestant sects—the emphases upon conversion and voluntary election. This becomes all the more obvious when the Center's sectarian interpretations become the basis of the presumption to "correct" those of duly constituted ecclesiastical authority.

The Center displayed the sectarian *notae* of austerity and the conviction of persecution. While it did not advocate a Protestant interpretation of "the priesthood of believers" or of "private interpretation," its leaders—laymen and in one prominent case a laywoman—spoke in a manner of persons "having authority," and highly suggestive of attempted usurpation

of ecclesiastical authority. The Center like most sects spoke "with authority" and certainly met Wach's criterion of claiming to be "renewing the original spirit" of the Church.

·By March 1949, St. Benedict Center had become an incipient sect within the body of the Catholic Church. It was inevitable that as such it would sooner or later become involved in serious conflict with ecclesiastical authority. When the time would arrive a decision would have to be taken—a decision to remain within the Church and modify itself or to become a fully developed sect outside of and in opposition to the Church. (This was as far as the original study went. The events of the next several days are analyzed on the basis of material in the Boston *Herald, Post, Globe,* and *Traveler.* The events more than amply confirmed the writer's conclusion.)

The Time of Decision

On Thursday, April 14, 1949, the Boston papers announced in banner headlines that four Boston College teachers had been dismissed. Said the morning *Post*:

> Three members of the Boston College faculty and a teacher at Boston College High School were discharged today. . . .

The evening *Globe* of the same day declared, "B.C. Replies to Ousted Teachers," and quoted the college president as saying:

> These gentlemen in question were under contract at Boston College to teach philosophy and physics. They had been cautioned by me and others in authority here to stay within their own fields and leave theology to those who were adequately and competently prepared.

> They continued to speak in class and out of class on matters contrary to the traditional teaching of the Catholic Church, ideas leading to bigotry and intolerance.

> Their doctrine is erroneous and as such could not be tolerated at Boston College. They were informed that they must cease such teaching or leave the faculty.

The four teachers, two of whom were converts, accused Boston College of teaching heresy. As reported in the Boston *Globe,* April 14, 1949, they declared such heretical instruction consisted in teaching:

Both explicity and implicitly that (1) there may be salvation outside the Catholic Church, (2) that a man may be saved without admitting that the Roman Catholic Church is supreme among the churches, (3) that a man may be saved without submission to the Pope.

At four o'clock of the afternoon of the next day, which was Good Friday, worshippers at six Catholic churches in Boston, including the Cathedral, were surprised to see before the church two and in some cases three men carrying placards which read "No Salvation Outside the Church" and offering for sale a publication entitled *From the Housetops*. About an hour before the picketing began, the newspapers had received an anonymous phone call from a person who said he represented St. Benedict Center, informing them that there would be "something doing at four o'clock" outside a number of churches which he specified. The following day, April 16th, the Associated Press reported "Vatican sources" as saying that "the Boston College controversy" was in the jurisdiction of the Boston Archbishop.

In the meantime the connection between the discharged teachers and the Center had become more generally known. On the evening of the next day, April 17th, the spiritual director of the Center issued a prepared statement in their defense, while the discharged four themselves announced that they were appealing "directly to His Holiness the Pope" since they felt that the Boston College president could not have acted "without consulting His Excellency the Archbishop." The St. Benedict Center group were openly revolting and in usual revolutionary fashion bypassing conventional channels of authority. They had decided to make, or at least under the pressure of the events they found themselves making, an intransigent stand upon their narrow sectarianism which had now been focused upon and symbolized by an unequivocal and literalist understanding of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Incipient sectarianism had led to open "protest"— in defiance of ecclesiastical authority.

The response was not long in coming. On Monday, April 18th, the Archbishop declared that the spiritual director of the Center

because of grave offense against the laws of the Catholic Church has lost the right to perform any priestly function, including preaching and teaching of religion.

His Excellency further revealed that the Center's chaplain had been "defying the orders of legitimate superiors for more than seven months" and

since the first of January of that year had "not possessed the faculties of this Archdiocese." He further decreed that the Center was forbidden to Catholics and that those who took part in its activities would "forfeit the right to receive the Sacrament of Penance and Holy Eucharist" (Boston *Globe*, April 19, 1949).

The next day the "silenced" priest declared the Archbishop's action to be "invalid," and the board of directors of the Center stated that the Center was "not founded by a decree of the Archbishop and would not be dissolved by such (Boston *Globe*, April 20, 1949). The Center was now in fact a dissenting sect.

At this time the Center group formed itself into an organization called the "Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary" while continuing their rebellion against ecclesiastical authority, thus displaying a sectarian combination of dramatized humility and arrogant revolt. The record of sectarianism and revolt continued despite expulsion of the spiritual director from the Society of Jesus, rulings of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office at Rome, and excommunication. The Center group members adopted a peculiar habit in dress. They had about 40 members, some of whom withdrew from Catholic colleges in the area. The group continued its conflict against Church authority which was sometimes dramatized in publicity-seeking ways, such as bursting into the office of the late Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago. Sometime afterwards they became openly anti-Semitic and advocated such views in their public meetings.

Conclusion

It has been pointed out that Catholicism—as a result of its place within the structure of Western society and its past history—is subject to two major strains. The first arises from its defensiveness in the face of modern secular culture and modern thought. The second derives from the rigidities of its institutionalized structures both in thought and organization. Moreover, American Catholicism, beginning as a lower-class social phenomenon whose members have experienced considerable recent social mobility, finds these two strains especially magnified. In the St. Benedict Center case, an originally Catholic group embodying the Catholic point of view and Catholic values found itself confronted by that vast and impressive manifestation of modern secular culture which is Harvard University. In this encounter the bearers of the minority culture and values were thrown on the defensive. To the elements of value uncertainty must be added the complications introduced by social mobility.

Moreover, a university which is an institutionalized context of intellectual encounter contains an important element of *anomie* in its very structure and content. In its libraries and lecture halls, viewpoints brought by the students from home, where they were often semiconsciously internalized, meet the challenge of the explicit examination and criticism of ideas. Students in college and university are exposed to the "dangers" involved in the "examined life." Thus the academic atmosphere is one that in any case would produce some degree of student anxiety and defensiveness. The element of criticism and appraisal and consequent anxiety was made more serious for Catholics by the "askewness" we have discussed in the relation between Catholicism and the dominant viewpoints of secular culture. Moreover, the Center attracted converts to Catholicism whose reaction against their own backgrounds increased the tendency to aggression and defense.

Thus in this case the element of defensiveness which is inherent in the contemporary position of Christianity was rendered more aggravated by the concrete encounter with Harvard. The general status of Catholics in the social structure of the United States further aggravated this strain by adding the uncertainties of social mobility and the strains of minority social status.

The second source of strain, the rigidities of Catholic thought and organization, was important in this case since there was not in the Harvard area at the time the kind of intellectual movements within Catholicism which would have represented a creative response to the problems involved in meeeting the encounter with secularism. This lack was the result both of the class and ethnic background of Boston Catholics and the inhibition of creative movements by the rigidities of overinstitutionalization. Had such a movement existed it would have provided a creative outlet for Catholics in such circumstances and also the intellectual and emotional support that could have eased the effects of strain. Such support and such a creative possibility could have prevented individuals from being driven into a radically defensive position.

As a consequence a number of Catholic students led by a Jesuit priest and several adult Catholic lay people made the sectarian response. They attempted to escape from the field by a wholesale abandonment of modern culture and transmuted their extreme defensivness into aggression by the assumption of a militant sectarian attitude. The extreme quality of the response testifies to the severity of the strain. Catholic action being impossible, Catholic reaction set in. This situation of the impossibility of creative action leading to reaction is one to be seen in the responses of many "right-wing"

groups both religious and secular. It is not surprising that the group in question here eventually embraced anti-Semitism since this has been fairly typical of extreme reactionary movements in western culture.

Most Catholic students at Harvard and at other secular colleges avoid the radical effects of the strain involved in the encounter with secularism. It is to be suspected that they do it by various forms of compartmentalization. But the strains which found expression in the present case appear to be present for those who occupy more moderate and modal positions.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COURAGE

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Durkheim (*The Division of Labor in Society*) showed how the interdependence of specialists underlies organic social solidarity. The farmer depends upon the smith for his plow, while the smith looks to the farmer for food. The soldier, defending both against an outside enemy, is fed by the farmer and armed by the smith. Together they resist the threat of the enemy or of a drought. Yet their solidarity is not unambiguous. Anxieties arise within the very structure of their cooperation which endanger their relation. We term these "existential anxieties" since they inhere in the nature of action. Existential anxieties face the individual at the inception of his act. Derivatively, they produce a social problem and call forth a social response. This paper begins by illustrating several types of existential anxieties. This is followed by an examination of some socially structured arrangements for assuring action despite them. A few research suggestions conclude the paper.

Anxieties Inherent in Social Action

Two uncertainties and one fearful certainty evoke existential anxieties. (1) There is an inherent uncertainty that what we do, our means, will at-

tain what we want, our goals. The soldier entering the fray is not assured of victory. Nevertheless, most soldiers mount their attack. (2) Discrete individuality obscures our intent from one another. We cannot be sure that our intents coincide. The smith may recall soldiers who deserted to the enemy. Yet, few smiths refuse them arms. It is sometimes said that these uncertainties are eliminated through inductive reasoning. The smith assumes that the soldier, having previously fulfilled his duty, will do so again. Inductive reasoning presents the probability of success. It begs the question to argue that individuals "take chances." How, at the inception of an act, do they bear the pangs of possible failure? (3) A fearful certainty haunts our every act. What we want always conflicts with what we want. A free choice implies a rejected as well as a selected value. Imagine, for example, a famine raging in the land. The enemy is attacking and the soldier calls for wheat. To comply, the farmer must deny his children their sustenance. The army truck halts at the gate. The farmer hesitates and then delivers the wheat. The notion of value hierarchies may be invoked to explain the farmer's action. He may reason that if the troops starve, the enemy will slay both him and his children. Yet, what enables him to suffer the cries of his children and still place the wheat on the truck? The rejected value has been internalized. Its violation provokes anxiety. How does the farmer do what he believes must be done despite this anxiety?

The literature on action tends to identify goal with reward. However, pain is the anticipated outcome of some significant acts. The martyr, for example, prefers the faggots to denial of conscience. One may say that the martyr endures pain expecting heaven. He forfeits earthly for the more highly valued heavenly life· As a value-conflict problem, it would be subject to the difficulties suggested above. (Two different types of values are involved. The farmer denying his children suffers guilt. This is the anxiety of being socially annihilated. The martyr faces the anxiety of being physically annihilated.) Further, since the scorching flame upon flesh temporally precedes inheritance of the kingdom of heaven, how may we explain his endurance during the last earthly moments?

The "existential anxieties" described above are rooted in the nature of social action. They reflect factual suffering imposed by concrete freedom of choice. Tillich (*The Courage to Be*, see especially Chapter 2, "Being, Nonbeing, and Anxiety"), dealing with the ontological and ethical rather than the social-psychological level, delineates three sources of "existential anxiety." These parallel the empirical anxieties. The ontological anxiety of death and fate appears on the action level as uncertainty, not knowing the issue of our acts. The ontological anxiety of condemna-

tion and guilt, a problem of evil in human relations, implies the selection of one relation over another, the value-conflict issue. Tillich's ontological anxiety of meaninglessness and emptiness conceals two categories. One concerns the meaning of man's relation to the cosmos, a cognitive indeterminacy, and the other concerns the problem of the meaning of meaning or of the ground of values. These two anxieties of meaninglessness did not appear in our sociological examples. Their primary empirical relevance is to indeterminacies in culture: the incompleteness of man's knowledge of nature and the ultimate value attitudes underlying specific choices.

Motivating Action Despite Anxiety

A value conflict or a condition of uncertainty is experienced as anxiety because conflicting motives are engaged or because an early trauma is reactivated. Parsons (and Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process,* see especially Chapter III, "The Organization of Personality as a System"), combining psychodynamic and sociological structural-functional thinking, traces the genetic differentiation of specific motives from an undifferentiated motivational reservoir. The individual's motive system is structured with respect to successively cathected social objects. Motives are constituted by energy organized about the internalized counterparts of these social objects. Successively more differentiated social objects and internal motive systems are produced by successively splitting each social object and motive in two. Thus, each pair of differentiated conflicting motives is rooted, at some prior level, in a common undifferentiated source. This genealogy of the conflicting motives reveals a way of handling the anxiety· The conflict on a more differentiated level can be undercut by regressing to their common predecessor. This, in effect, implies simultaneous realization of both sides of an ambivalence. For example, a person may be torn between affection and hostility toward his comrade. Drinking with him, he regresses and alternately expresses both feelings. As a consequence, the relationship is strengthened. (See Myerson, "Alcohol: A Study of Social Ambivalence," *Quarterly Journal of Studies in Alcohol,* 1:1, pp. 13-20; and Lolli, "Alcoholism as a Disorder of the Love Disposition," *Quarterly Journal of Studies in Alcohol,* 17:1, pp. 96-107.) Similarly, return to a less differentiated value allows a synthetic realization of the conflicting ones. For example, the farmer caught between the obligations of his loyalty to the army and to his children subsumes both under the value of preserving lives or, perhaps, establishing "a new way of life." Providing wheat to the army and denying the children become two aspects of this same overarching act. (Energy is not channeled into one side of the conflict, supplying the army, so that it outweighs the anxiety on the other side. Similarly, on the cultural level, it is not a case of one value being selected

in preference to another. A value hierarchy determines the direction of the new act but does not imply disappearance of a rejected value. Starving the children is inherent in supplying the army. Supplying the army appears quite differently if no children cry in the background). The energy which, on the more differentiated level, had appeared as anxiety, actually contributes to the act. Denying the children may be formulated as a necessary sacrifice. By tapping the prior motivational reservoir, the inhibiting or negative directionality of the anxiety is vitiated. The sacrifice, at this level, becomes a joy.

By what means is this relatively undifferentiated motivational level tapped? Special social roles arise which are designed to accomplish a controlled regression. The religious worship role is an example. When, by virtue of the regression, the role occupant is experiencing a more basic motivational level, the role is connected to the role in which the conflicting values or the uncertainties exist. For example, a war dance supplies part of the motivation for realizing a warrior role. The newly released energy is channeled into the new act. This is a "regression in the service of the ego." (The choice of the value to be supported may, of course, be determined by super-ego or id forces. The value choice, however, is not the problem of this paper.) The ego remains in control of the role to be enacted. The regression takes place in the special adjunct or associated role. Behavior in the principal role does not regress. The farmer does not regress either in relation to his children or to the army.

Definition of Courage

The result of channeling genetically prior motivational resources into support of more differentiated values is manifested as an act of courage. Courage may be defined as an attitude enabling action in the face of anxiety. (Various aspects of the social psychology of courage not treated in this paper have been described by the author in "Worship," an unpublished report of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1959; and in "Why They Chose Israel: A Theory of Emigration," *Archives de Sociologie des Religions,* No. 9, 1960). Courage provides neither certainty nor perfection but enables action despite uncertainty and imperfection. (The mechanisms of defense, which also enable action in anxiety-provoking situations, differ from courage on two counts. First, the mechanisms of defense obscure the perception of anxiety. The source of fear is obfuscated by denial, or an internal conflict is projected upon another person. Courage, on the other hand, enters when the indvidual acts despite consciousness of anxiety. Second, the defense mechanisms act "automatically." One cannot decide to sublimate or employ reaction-for-

mation. Courage implies a conscious decision, an act of will.) Tillich uses the term "faith" in a similar sense.

Our definition of faith or courage has several implications. (1) Faith is analytically distinguished from values. It refers to motivational energy channeled in the support of a value. It is generated in one role for application in another. Courage is not "good" in itself. Ethical judgment depends upon an attitude toward the values supported. Both Hitler and Jesus may be considered men of high faith. One, however, directed his faith for evil and the other for virtue. (2) Faith does not create an illusion. For example, Malinowski describes the Trobrianders' ceremonial preparations for deep-sea fishing. He suggests that their anxiety is allayed by an illusion that the spirits will protect them against storms or deliver fish into their nets. It would follow from the above definition that the ceremony enables the Trobrianders to paddle out to sea conscious that it may storm and that the fish may not fall prey. (3) Courage or faith is not defined in terms of its attributes but rather in terms of its function—enabling action in the face of anxiety. (4) Faith, as used here, does not refer to "assent to doctrine."

Social-Structural Arrangements for the Achievement of Courage

Because existential anxiety inheres in every free act, individuals universally need courage. Further, were individuals to lack courage, social roles would lie dormant. Consequently, society has an interest in courage. It is not surprising, therefore, that social institutions develop means to assure individual achievement of courage or faith. This is a central function of the worship role in religious institutions. The family in conjunction with its responsibility for procreation and socialization contributes to courage-achieving. Communal structures or ethnic groupings, while concerned with power and the transmission of tradition, also institutionalize means for the achievement of courage. We will illustrate faith achievement in religious institutions. The reader should not confuse the social-psychological concept of faith with the theological idea of faith. The verb "to achieve" would be inappropriate for the latter. The following examples are drawn from institutional religion. An individual in solitude may also attain faith.

Faith achievement "ideal-typically" occurs in four steps. Each step represents a social-structural arrangement which influences the organization of energies within the participating personalities.

Step 1. *Who May Worship.* The boundaries of the worship group are defined by implicit admission criteria. By and large, one cannot earn his way into a worship group. Admission rests upon inherent qualities, among which birth into the group is usually central. Voluntary joining requires a ceremony symbolizing death and rebirth. Consequently, religious groups tend to become segregated in terms of their members' inherent social attributes. Thus, individuals are personally accepted without needing to prove themselves. Energies are not engaged in a struggle for belongingness but are freed for the realization of selected values. Were the process to stop at this point, the religious group would provide a temporary tension-reducing retreat from the world with little relevance for action in the world·

Step 2. *Achieving Brotherhood.* The second step confirms and reaffirms social solidarity. Solidarity may be symbolized by physical convergence. The congregation assembles on a festival. Pilgrims gather at a religious shrine. Roman Catholics at Lourdes and Moslems at Mecca incarnate transnational unity. Ethical and charitable norms bind in mutual obligation. The obligation to fellows is more stringent than toward those without the congregation. Mutual declarations of belief signify commonality. For faith achievement, the validity of the assertion is less significant than the implication that those dedicated to the same idea belong together. Ritual rhythms cause many to move as one. The rhythm may be that of a thrice-yearly temple assemblage or of a weekly joining in prayer. Liturgical rhythms direct the congregation to rise or sit at one time. Hymns blend many voices. Set times and common language of religious ceremony destroy the remoteness of worshipping communities. Moslems, wherever they may be, kneel for the *jumm'a* at noon Friday. Though unable to converse secularly, Kurdish-, Turkish- and Urdu-speaking Moslems pray together in Arabic. Myths of common origin assert the symbolic brotherhood of the descendants. Eschatological myths bind them in common fate. Sacrifice unites worshippers with one another and with their gods. A lamb, a representation of the worshipper, is placed upon the altar and consumed by the god. Metaphorically, god eats man and they become one. Worshippers become one flesh through totemic commensality: by eating the common god. These are structural arrangements to mobilize cathected social objects. Social unification is paralleled by internal mobilization of the cathecting energies.

Step 3. *Releasing and Channeling Feeling.* In this context of solidarity, the mobilized energies are released and channeled into action. (Channeling the energy from the regressive role to the role to be enacted requires establishing "cross-ties" between the roles. Lack of space precludes specifying these mechanisms tying the roles together.) Solemnity in worship is

significant. Laughter could disperse the emotions aimlessly. Inhibition is for the emotions what a secret is for the intellect. It seals off an expressive sector of the personality from one's fellows. Certain inhibitions are overcome. Confession abridges both the intellectual and affective barriers. Incense plays upon the gentler emotions. Light, color, and fire excite. Stained-glass windows hide the outer world's disturbing stimuli. Dimness casts visual restraints into vagueness. Previously, movement *together* incarnated social solidarity· Now *movement* together guides emotional release. The rhythmic beat quickens. Distinctions between pulses may disappear, the structure dissolving into an emotional shriek. This fading of structure heralds the fourth step.

Step 4. *Complete Release*. Most faith-achieving stops short of this step. The mystic goes on. Emotion is no longer channeled into action but dissipated within the faith-achieving act itself. Religion, in this limiting case, becomes substitutive rather than preparatory action. Instead of a war dance leading to an attack, pins are thrust into an effigy. The mystic is less concerned with external social-structural arrangements than with control of the outer layers of consciousness. This enables him to reach an even deeper level of self. The steps taken by the mystic, however, are formally similar to those of normal religion. For example, his concentration on a single thought to achieve integration of consciousness parallels achieving solidarity among worshippers. Where the intended act involves endurance of pain, the internal orientation of the mystic gives him particular strength. On the other hand, the introversion makes it difficult to establish "cross-ties" with other roles. The mystic in entranced contemplation or frenzy tends to be passive toward externally oriented acts. (This courage-achieving model reverses Parsons' model of the genealogy of need-dispositions. Parsons argues that through interaction with social objects the child first learns to discriminate between specificity and diffuseness, then between affectivity and affective neutrality, then between particularism and universalism, and finally between performance and quality· In the courage-achieving model the decision as to who may worship under-cuts the performance-quality distinction. Achieving brotherhood returns the worshipper from universalistic to particularistic ties. The structural arrangements for the release and channeling of feeling stress affectivity in place of affective neutrality. Complete release is a return from a differentiated world guided by norms of specificity to a de-differentiated external and internal object system subject to the principle of diffuseness. This reversal in the priority of norms guiding the need-dispositions defines the nature of the regression. Cf. Parsons and Bales, *op. cit.*)

Research Problems

This model of courage achievement suggests directions for research. Below are five types of problems to which it draws attention.

1. *Assessment of Concrete Courage-Achieving Structures.* As an ideal type, this model may serve as a paradigm for describing concrete courage-achieving structures. The "efficiency" of such structures could be evaluated with reference to missing or attenuated steps. The model is formal. The content of each step is influenced by the nature of the values to be realized. For example, were battle courage the object, "moving together," an element in Step 2, might occur as frenzied dancing. Were a group preparing for martyrdom, it might be manifest as a swaying murmur. For each step, the adequacy of the content of worship could be evaluated with respect to the values to be enacted. One might hypothesize, for example, that pressure for liturgical revision would arise in a church where the worship content handed down by tradition is no longer consistent with the "style of life" of the worshippers.

2. *Comparison of Courage-Achieving Structures in Several Institutions.* Though religious examples were used to explicate the model, it is also applicable to other institutions. A Nuremburg rally or a May Day parade has courage-achieving forms and functions similar to that of Holy Communion or a procession of the Blessed Sacrament. It would be instructive to compare the consequences of orientation to a "parochial community" with those of orientation to an "absolute reality." An aspect of neurosis is inability to act in the face of anxiety. Psychotherapy involves courage-achieving. A researcher might, using this single model, compare courage-achieving in a dyadic or small group with that in the mass situations from which our illustrations were drawn. Group morale is, in part, the courageousness of its members taken together. What is the difference between the morale of a crusading army and that of a fighting force welded by rational discipline?

3. *The Relation between Personality and Social Structure in Courage-Achieving.* The model is based upon an interrelation between social-structural arrangements and the organization of individual personality. A study using this model could correlate psychological and sociological measures. The model suggests, for example, a tendency toward homogeneity of social attributes among worshippers. What are the implications for the "efficiency" of faith-achieving when worshippers are drawn from several social groups or strata? What ensues when a single stratum controls the church

and selects the content of faith-achieving in view of its peculiar values? What does this imply for religious schismogenesis?

4. *The Compatibility of the Structural Requirements for Courage-Achieving with the Requirements for Other Institutional Functions.* Religion, besides helping its members achieve faith, also deals with problems of meaning and contributes to the social and value integration of society. These functions may require structural arrangements incompatible with those necessary for the achievement of faith. For example, problems of meaning tend to be handled by rational religious knowledge. While rationality requires a dissociation of self from its objects, faith-achieving requires that they be intimately related. How do concrete structures deal with these incompatible requirments? Further, rationality implies subjection of the world to general factual or moral principles. Achieving brotherhood involves movement from the abstract norm to personal relational solidarities. How is this conflict between loyalty, on the one hand, and cognitive validity and morality, on the other hand, resolved?

Non-parochial religions in pluralistic societies stress ethical universalism. Faith-achieving stresses the solidarity of the segregated group. What are the implications for religion and for society of this conflict between the socially integrative and faith-achieving functions?

Religion, in contributing to the value integration, requires power to sanction value deviation. The coercive power associated with hierocratic authority is incompatible with the requirement of free submission to membership by virtue of inherent qualities irrespective of performance. Faith-achieving cannot be based upon compulsion to assent. Further, value integration tends to reinforce traditional values. The energy of faith may support deviant values. What are the implications of this pull between change and tradition?

5. *The Measurement of Courage.* We have been concerned with the process of courage-achieving. The outcome of that process may be assessed. While faith or courage is not given to quantitative measurement, people may be ordered according to their willingness to act courageously. Courage scales have been developed on this principle. Consistent with the analytical distinction between faith or courage and values, an individual is presented with a series of hypothetical situations in which he knows what is "right" to do. A penalty, however, is incurred for doing the "right" thing. Respondents are ordered according to their willingness to suffer in support of the accepted value. The type of courage is designated according to the nature of the risk or penalty involved. Scales measure willingness to risk

the physical, moral, and social selves. The respondent is asked, for each of four successively increasing degrees of risk, whether another person and then he himself would definitely, probably, probably not, or definitely not act. The response pattern to each scale gives his score. Since these are Guttman-type scales, his score gives his position in the population. (The first version of this test included sixteen scales. Four of them were eliminated since they did not meet the Guttman requirement of reproducibility. By means of a factor analysis the remaining twelve scales were grouped into the three categories of physical, moral, and social courage. By eliminating four scales redundant in factor loadings, the number was reduced to seven. A monograph describing the test is in preparation. Meanwhile, single copies of the test are available from the author.)

The values to be supported in these scales are highly general. Following the same principle, a specific organization may construct scales based on its own values. When acceptance of these values is not problematic, willingness to support them may be assessed directly. When the values are not fully institutionalized, assent to the value must be held constant while measuring the relative individual courage.

COGNITIVE STRUCTURES AND RELIGIOUS RESEARCH[1]

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It is the central thesis of this paper that the role of the sociologist in theological education and in religious research is inextricably related to the type of cognitive structure that informs his conception of the nature of sociology and of its relationship to other sciences. The manner in which this issue is resolved will commit the sociologist to some philosophic or theological tradition, either explicitly or by implication.

In the first portion of this paper it will be argued that the dominant cognitive structures extant in current American sociological discussions are informed primarily by the atomistic heritage of Democritus in classical Greek philosophy, or by the skeptical tradition in the heritage of the Greek Sophists, or by some combination of the two. At the same time, the domi-

nant cognitive structures in Christian theology are informed primarily by traditions related either to Aristotle or to Plato. Most Catholic formulations are seen as being more closely related to the Aristotelian tradition, while most Protestant formulations are related to some variant of the Platonic heritage.[2] Because of these relationships, theoretical differences between most theologians and most sociologists are to be expected. Different understandings about the nature of science, about the meaning of power, freedom, history, love, and justice, about method in the social studies, about the meaning of "religion," about the nature and destiny of man, and about the nature and character of God emerge. The relationship between "facts" and the cognitive structure employed by the analyst is obtuse. It is argued that the current fashionableness of certain modes of analysis in sociology is a contingent and not a categorical matter and that one of the tasks of persons engaged in religious research and teaching sociology of religion is to facilitate conversation on method and cognitive structures between social science colleagues and theological colleagues.[3] Further, it might be suggested that they explore the implications for research of informing structures other than the ones fashionable in the social studies.[4]

The second portion of this paper considers the issue of research on substantive problems, granted the kind of root difficulties outlined in the first portion of this paper.

The Problem of the Relationship Between Theology and Sociology

Considered formally, four approaches to the relationship between theology and sociology are possible. Two of the approaches will make distinctions between various disciplines and two will argue for a basic unity of the sciences, although one of the latter will usually distinguish between science and an area of nonscience, in which theology would find its place.

In classical antiquity, two traditions emerged which have characteristically tended to produce a multiplicity of the sciences.

The first of these is embodied in the works of Aristotle, who developed the classic distinctions among the theoretic, the practical, and the aesthetic disciplines. Within each of these broad groupings further generic and specific differentiations are evolved, so that each discipline is ultimately seen in its proper but distinct relationship to every other discipline. Clearly, it is possible in this tradition to engage in work in the social sciences without necessarily becoming involved in ontological issues qua social scientist. Because of the clear-cut distinctions among the several disciplines, it is possible to claim that one may legitimately focus on certain problems with-

out entertaining explicit theological concerns. Historically, Roman Catholic sociologists are most frequently seen to sustain this tradition. Because of the common concern of most sociologists with what in the Aristotelian tradition is called "efficient cause," there is some commonality between workers in this group and other sociologists, although the latter group is almost invariably suspicious when Aristotelian or Thomist sociologists see what is, from their point of view, the necessity of discussing the other causes, particularly "final cause."

Freedom is seen in the context of social and political institutions, although a root differentiation has placed the entire area of the social studies in the practical disciplines, concerned with actions initiated by the actor who has inherently the possibility of selecting other actions than those he has chosen. On principle, this group is apt to argue for a fundamental three-fold organization of the sciences, as did Aristotle.[5]

A second group that will argue for a multiplicity of the sciences is exemplified in classical antiquity by the Sophists.[6] A thorough-going principle of relativity informs their work. "Man is," said one of their representatives, Protagoras, "the measure of all things." The kinds of differentiations that are made in the disciplines are conventional, depending upon a consensus among workers in an area. No appeal to objective criteria inherent in the nature of things is possible for proponents of this perspective. Definitions in sociology, or in any other area, are "operational." Freedom is defined in terms of the ability of one agent to influence the overt or covert behavior of others. Ultimately, the free man is the strong man. Because of the denial of any transcendental elements in this tradition, it is not possible to discuss or consider God except as one attempts to see manifestations of what are purported to be responses to the divine in human behavior.

This tradition—or some variant of it—is extremely popular and widespread in the "behavioral sciences" at the present time. The root assumption of the meaning of power informing American stratification theory—in either the Weber or Warner strand—for example, is that which is advanced in this tradition. Although an interesting modification of the Sophistic heritage is made by some social psychologists who want to uphold the self-affirming and creative character of the self,[7] this group is also seen as belonging to this tradition. At the same time, it should be noted that this tradition has never been popular—for what to this writer seem legitimate reasons—among almost all theologians.[8] Hence, as noted briefly in the introduction to this paper, basic disagreements between sociologists and

theologians with reference to the categorical scheme to interpret contingent data are to be expected.

The other two formally possible approaches argue for a unity of the sciences. As was the case with the two approaches arguing for a multiplicity of the sciences, one of the traditions arguing for a unity of the sciences has been popular in the Christian heritage, while the other is more popular among social scientists at the present time.

The Platonic heritage represents one of the two groups in antiquity that argued for a unity of the sciences, in the sense that no formal criteria could be found inherent in the nature of things to permit basic differentiations on principle between areas of study. Such differentiations as do, in fact, emerge are based on contingent and not on categorical considerations. Because the ultimate unity of the sciences is based upon the systematic interrelatedness and hierarchical ordering of the forms, a strong faith in rationalism is characteristic of this heritage. Participation in the same form by different events assures common elements in experience. There is no reason, however, that all the sciences would focus on the same areas. On the contrary, the way in which potential is actualized is subject to empirical investigation. The meaning of freedom is markedly different than in the Sophistic tradition. The free man is ultimately the wise man, the philosopher who has penetrated to the nature of things. The language pointing to the ontology informing this tradition is the language of harmony and disharmony. Power as understood in the operational heritage is only one dimension of the meaning of power for the dialectical tradition. Because transcendental elements are essential to make sense out of immanent ones, God as he is understood in this heritage is possessed of at least one, and possibly more, intrinsic qualities.[9] Variants of this heritage, particularly the volitional, have been popular among theologians, although, again, very few contemporary social scientists entertain it. Those neo-Kantians who make some distinction in kind between the theoretic and practical sciences usually do not include the dimension of "revelation," the confrontation of God transcending form and matter, which theologians in the Kantian heritage usually do, although some analysts, such as Otto in the field of the history of religion, do so.

The other group that tends to argue for a unity of the sciences is the atomist. The general tendency is to delineate an area which is "science" and another area which is "nonscience." In antiquity, Democritus may be taken as representative of this group. In the modern period, the Freudian tradition is representative. Consciousness tends to become epiphenomenal and is to be understood in relation to some more basic set of elements. Free-

dom consists in understanding what the forces are that have made one what he is, not in order to transcend them, but in order to accept them and to live in conformity to them. The pleasure-pain principle is generally cited to interpret human behavior. A rewards-punishment schema is used. Generally, this tradition has attempted to understand God by reference to forces or elements that are alleged to have produced notions about him. Although the formulations differ in some significant respects, this general pattern is seen in Freud's notion of God as the projection of a father figure and Durkheim's notion of the relation between the conception of God and the social group.[10] Most contemporary structural-functional analysis of religion in sociology is related either to this heritage or to the operational one.[11] Again, most theologians—for reasons which seem to be legitimate—have resisted the atomistic tradition. Hence major disagreements with sociological proponents of this heritage are also to be expected. Neither the operational nor the atomistic tradition as expressed in antiquity and/or as appropriated in the modern period permits the employment of transcendental dimensions which seem to many to be necessary for a religiously satisfying understanding of God.

For the Aristotelian and Platonic heritages—including the significant variants of these traditions represented in Christendom—religious experience may properly be understood as a confrontation with the ultimate.[12] On the other hand, in the traditions most popular and widespread in the social sciences today, religion is to be understood as a function of some other phenomenon or is to be defined in operational terms. That the sociologist working in a theological environment will encounter some disagreement with his theological colleagues if he chooses to appropriate the cognitive structures popular in the social sciences today is to be expected.

The phenomenon also operates in a reverse manner. Except for Roman Catholic sociologists, who have founded their own society, very few persons working professionally as sociologists seem to have appropriated either the Aristotelian or Platonic heritages. For example, the language of balance, harmony, disharmony, an intrinsic propensity toward aesthetic contrast, hierarchies of society, levels of abstraction, freedom as internal to the organism, etc., and the Platonic ontology to which such language is related seem alien to the social sciences today. The very way in which sociology would be conceptualized would differ, although there would be convergences at relatively low levels of abstraction. However, the objective of prediction or control as verification of a schema would be alien to this heritage, as it would be to other segments of this broad tradition represented in theology. There would be much less inclination to attempt to isolate "variables" determining or conditioning behavior than is the case

in much contemporary social science, particularly among analysts in the Pareto tradition.[13] Because of the significance of certain idiosyncratic dimensions in human behavior, the analyst in this tradition may, at times, prefer historical material, emphasizing the significance of the individual and unique to the sociologist's effort to discern the general and universal.[14]

The Sophistic and atomistic heritages are most apt to differentiate statements of fact from statements of value and attempt to affirm the "objective" character of science. Its proponents are apt to decry the "Christian sociology" characteristic of an earlier epoch. Although the proponents of "Christian sociology" were not always as clear as they might have been about the root notions which permitted the use of the term, most Christian formulations would want to see normative dimensions involved in social analysis while most secular sociologists would not. From the point of view entertained in this paper, such disagreements are to be expected in the light of the differing cognitive structures informing their work.[15]

In summary, this section of the paper has tried to show that the sociologist must inevitably become involved in theological issues at crucial points as he undertakes the study of religious phenomena and that, if he chooses to employ the traditions dominant in American sociology, he will be employing cognitive structures which differ from those dominant in the theological tradition. Hence, disagreements in this area seem inevitable.

The Sociologist and Substantive Material

If one grants the alternative ways of abstracting from the manifold of experience outlined in the first portion of this paper, the question of how contingent materials are to be handled still remains to be resolved. It is at this point that the researcher concerned with empirical data may make a special contribution to knowledge.

Theologian qua theologian has completed his task when he has developed a categorical schema. By "categorical schema" is meant a cognitive structure of universal dimensions, one so general that all contingent For example, Reinhold Niebuhr's notion of "man as a part of nature." data are to be understood as exemplifications of the categorical schema.[16] Tillichs notion of "destiny" as one pole of a basic ontological polarity, and Whitehead's notion of "causal efficacy" all suggest that the human organism is conditioned by his environment.[17] This observation is a categorical one. The questions of "how much," "in what degree," and "in relation to what structures" are contingent questions with which a sociologist may deal.[18]

Granted that the implicit categorical schema employed by the analyst cannot help but condition his research efforts, two differences in emphasis seem to be open to the person working in a theological context. First, he may employ a categorical schema in which to set his data and which, in part, will direct his research. Such an approach may involve him in major disagreements with his sociological colleagues or with his theological colleagues, depending on what type of schema he employs. Second, he may attempt to present his data at a low level of abstraction, undertaking descriptive and typological studies. One of the problems that is encountered in the attempt to use reports of sociological investigations is that often the findings are of limited usefulness to persons employing alternative categorical schemata. The problem is minimized, although not eliminated by the effort to deal with research data at a low level of abstraction.[19]

EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. This paper is a revised version of a paper prepared for a panel discussion on Sociologists in Theological Education held at the fifty-fifth annual meeting of the American Sociological Association.

2. In this paper epistemological and anthropological problems which differentiate most Protestant theologians from Plato will not be considered in detail. The problem, insofar as it results in a different ordering of the sciences, must be treated briefly later in the body of this paper.

3. Because of the structure of university and theological education, and the type of bureaucracy and institutionalization that has developed historically, this type of dialogue is very difficult to initiate and to carry on at a level of significance at present. Aristotle might have countenanced the use of academic "departments," but Plato would have been disheartened by such institutional patterns.

4. For example, current sociological theory makes it very difficult to order data dealing with political life in other than that of a power struggle, as, for example, in Hunter's **Community Power Structure**. On the other hand, the work **Reflections on Government**, by Sir Ernst Barker, who stands in the Aristotelian tradition, provides a structure involving both normative and descriptive dimensions. On a somewhat more esoteric but a very suggestive and interesting theoretic level, the dominant sociological cognitive structures make it very difficult to order psychic phenomena such as telepathy. Many in the Platonic tradition would be very interested in such phenomena because their theoretic structure would be such as to allow readily for such phenomena, although the overarching structure obviously would not stand or fall on the presence or absence of the reliable observation of such phenomena in the present cosmic epoch.

5. See, for example, the theoretic distinctions made by Furfey in **The Scope and Method of Sociology** or by Fichter in **Sociology.**

6. In this paper, no systematic effort is made to trace the way in which the unity or multiplicity of the sciences is defended. It is possible to arrive at differentiations of, or unity of, the sciences in a variety of ways, either methodologically or epistemologically or by a combination of the two.

7. See, for example, Mead's **Mind, Self, and Society** and Coutu's **Emergent Human Nature.** Hook's **The Hero in History** is an interesting philosophic formulation in a similar perspective.

8. An interesting relationship emerges between representatives of this heritage and Christian theologians who are extremely skeptical about the ability of human reason to penetrate to the nature of things, such as Barth. There may be a provisional alliance between the two groups, atlhough the sociologists in this heritage frequently have considerable faith in the ability of technical reason to resolve problems in the human arena.

9. The volitional facet of this heritage in Christian theology, in which the ability of reason to penetrate to the nature of things is rejected in favor of an experiential confrontation with God transcending form, stems from Paul and is implanted in the thought of such theologians as Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr. Kant, in his distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, possesses analogues to these theologians. Such persons are of interest from the point of view taken in this paper because the exercise of this epistemological option will produce a multiplicity of the sciences, although its structure will be somewhat different than the Aristotelian or operational multiplicity. Like Aristotle, it will be based on principle, but the appeal to principle will be different. The neo-Kantian tradition of Dilthey, Rickert, Weber, Troeltsch, and their modern successors bases its understanding of the social studies on the Kantian distinction between "pure" reason and "practical" reason, although not all of them articulate a full-blown Kantian categorical scheme. The distinction between statements of fact and statements of value, so popular in this heritage, stands or falls on the Kantian categorical distinctions.

A further anthropological distinction shoud be noted. The theologians cited here see a propensity toward disharmony internal to the nature of man and thus tend to order the data of the social world differently from the social scientists cited in this passage.

It is characteristic of social scientists in this heritage to think the social sciences should look for tendencies and configurations, but that it is not to be expected that they will achieve the precision apparently available in some of the physical sciences.

10. See Freud's **Moses and Monotheism, A New Series of Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, The Future of An Illusion, Civilization and Its Discontents,** and Durkheim's **The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.**

11. For example, Warner's treatment of religion in **Democrary in Jonesville,** Davis' **Human Society,** Yinger's **Religion, Society, and The Individual,** Williams' treatment of religion in **American Society,**

LaBarre's in **The Human Animal,** Hoult's in **Sociology of Religion,** Parsons' in **The Social System,** and most other contemporary works in the field.

12. The precise way in which the phrase "confrontation with the ultimate" will be interpreted will vary, depending upon which facet of the tradition is being considered. The point to be noted here is that for all these traditions religion is a response to that which in some sense is ultimate and transcendental. God is not to be interpreted as a product of other more elemental factors.

13. As noted earlier, most neo-Kantians also reject the criteria of prodiction and control. Although the understanding of freedom that informs their work is different in some dimensions from that in the Christian tradition, the two groups will agree on this notion. It is what has been termed the atomistic tradition that is most prone to speak of determinism.

14. These analysts would probably concur with Wordsworth's observation, "We murder to dissect." Such an observation is of a piece with the organic wholistic orientation of the dialectical heritage.

15. The Kantian bifurcation of the world places the neo-Kantians in an interesting "middle ground" between most sociologists and some theologians. As noted earlier, the Weberian distinction between statement of fact and statement of value stands or falls on the validity of this root epistemological assumption.

16. Whether such a schema can ever be devised is questionable. At any rate, it is an ideal toward which the theologian may move. It should be noted that the formulations undertaken in this portion of the paper present two major problems. First, it may be argued that the stance taken here presupposes a strong rationalistic bias on the part of the writer. In part, such a criticism is legitimate. However, the writer knows of no way to resolve this problem, since critics must also employ some type of cognitive structure which seems open to some general appropriation. Second, the analysis does presuppose the validity of a categorical-contingent distinction, which proponents of some of the traditions delineated would want to deny. Because of the writer's affirmation of the theological heritage, the resolution of the problem is set in the fashion outlined in this portion of the paper.

17. See Niebuhr's **The Nature and Destiny of Man,** Tillich's **Systematic Theology,** and Whitehead's **Process and Reality.**

18. It may be noted that the phrase "conditioned by his environment" presupposes a notion of internal freedom which would be rejected by some of the informing cognitive structures employed in contemporary sociological work. It further suggests that the direction of research efforts in the social studies is apt to be somewhat different for one informed by any of the cited perspectives.

19. It should be noted that one of the very few times in the history of Christian theology that a significant number of theologians employed basic cognitive structures bearing strong kinship to what have here been called the atomistic and operational traditions was in the so-called "liberal" period of Protestant theology. It was dur-

ing this period, roughly 1880-1930, that sociology came to wide-spread use in American theological education and that various religious research groups were founded. The decline of influence of this movement in theology has undoubtedly contributed to the different climate which persons engaged in religious research encounter today in Protestant theological seminaries and in Protestant denominational and interdenominational agencies. While the movement had some influence among Roman Catholics, it never achieved the widespread popularity attained in American Protestant theological circles.

REVIEWS OF CURRENT BOOKS

Religion in Contemporary Culture, A Study of Religion Through Social Science. By Purnell Handy Benson. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 839 pp., $8.00.

There are two ways of reviewing a book: one romantic, the other classical. If this were to be a romantic review, I should have to tell how this book affected me, whether I felt edified or informed, disheartened or encouraged about the present state of the scientific study of religion. Romantic reviews have long been out of fashion; they are too personal, too subjective. Moreover, this is a textbook; this means that, although it is a book, it is not a work of art. One does not expect to feel anything about a textbook, except possibly bored respect at the industry of the writer. I shall not write a romantic review.

A review in the classical style, then. Let us examine the intentions of the author, as these appear in the work itself. Once having finished this examination, we can make some judgments: has the author succeeded in his intentions? does the structure of the book carry the load of intention in a way that permits the reader, in the act of study, to shift the burden of insight to himself?

The author intends to demonstrate that the scientific study of religion is possible; that, in fact, it has been done. The awesome bulk of the book is the result of the author's attempt to digest these studies—practically all of them, milk and meat together—in one big meal for the college student. Moreover, not only has social science applied itself to religion, but the application itself has religious implications. For such scientific study may lead to something like a scientific religion, with "some of the central con-

cepts and principles of Christianity and other world religions" becoming "floors and walls in the new structure." Religion is really science touched with feeling. The author's own feelings are harmoniously religio-scientific. When he first "traveled the scientific road and pondered whether God would be found in the temple at the end of the search, he experienced mounting suspense." But the reader need not remain suspended; it was obvious, almost 811 pages back, that the author would find "God at the end of the road." What science did for him was to put some windows in his religious structure, "providing fresh openings to the clear skies above." This is, incidentally, the best writing in the book. The author's own romanticism does not prevent him from writing in a way that marks the accomplished textbook stylist: simple and yet unclear, dull about the most exciting subjects. This book has been written with embalming fluid.

But I am teetering on the verge of a romantic reaction. It does not indict a textbook to say that it is written in a style that will bore the most inquiring young student. More important, will he, despite his boredom or because of it, get a useful scheme for understanding the now rather venerable effort to study religion scientifically? Here the author's clumsiness will distract the fresh student. The first four chapters, on the relations between religion and science, are badly written and worse conceived. Even if the student gets by the first wrong sign—that "the latest to give evidence of appearing as a social science is the field of religion"—and has the patience to notice that the author means only that religion as a "field of study in social science makes its appearance," he will be misled by the author's unrestrained tumbling of one point of view after another. It is the author's intention to supply the reader with the entire range of study. But, in pursuing this laudable intention, he has lost a sense of structure. Jung follows Dewey without any effort at analytic transition by the author, and both follow an exposition of value theory as the kernel of the scientific study of religion. One brief exposition is only remotely connected with another. The uninstructed reader will be left in a muddle; the instructed reader will not need this textbook.

By chapter v titled "What Religion Is," Dr. Benson has reached the main part of his subject. But here another flaw in the structure of the book becomes apparent. Although he is writing as a social scientist, Benson's historical sense is almost entirely absent. The book slips and slides from one historical situation to another, from the American scene to the world scene, from past to present and back again—all without a firm theoretical control. At one moment he is addressing himself to problems of diversity and at another to universals. This insecure grip on theory ex-

presses itself in chapters that show no coherent relation one to another. And, within chapters, the same lack of coherence makes reading an act of collecting rather disparate bits of more or less familiar information. Thus, a little section on North American Indian religion follows a smaller section on American Protestantism; the principle putting them together, I suppose, was that both are "American." To say that both are forms of religious expression does not much help the student understand either the similarities or differences of function that each achieves within their own historical situations.

The author tries to reserve an exposition of religious functions to Part III of the book, chapters vii through x. Here he has put together, not for the first time, materials on the psychology of religion, which continues through chapter xi, which is assigned to Part IV, labelled "Causation of Religion." The author never takes up religious conceptions of direct and indirect causation to which the entire Western idea of God was linked.

With chapter xii, the author begins a review of more contemporary work in the sociology of religion. Again, the structure is too loose for the education of the reader. This ambitious text must be counted a failure because the author has no analytic structure of his own within which to mold the admirable erudition he brings to the subject. The entire work is vitiated by a mistaken intention to leave such analytic structuring to the student—or, perhaps, to the teacher adopting the text for his class use. By this intended restraint, the author has composed a textbook that quotes, exposits, describes—but lacks that fundamental coherence which transforms information into knowledge.

Philip Rieff, University of Pennsylvania

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The City Church—Death or Renewal: A Study of Eight Urban Lutheran Churches. By Walter Kloetzli with an "afterword" by Charles Glock. Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1961. 198 pp., $3.75.

What makes a city church effective? Kloetzli's book, the first publication from the National Council's Effective City Church Study, provides

one perspective on the problem. This is a descriptive, comparative work summarizing research results from eight Lutheran churches variously located in urban areas throughout the United States. Kloetzli's aims are two: first to find out how these eight selected churches operate in city settings, and, secondly, to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of their strategies.

To accomplish these objectives he draws on empirical materials from a variety of instruments, including a membership questionnaire. He organizes these results into two main sections. The first section is given to the description of each church as a total unit in terms of its history and surroundings, its physical facilities, leadership structure, program emphases, and special problems. This is an interesting and valuable part of the book for highlighting the immense diversity that develops among churches within a single denominational tradition.

The case-study section is followed by four chapters summarizing the returns of the questionnaire, filled out by a sample of more than 1,700 members. Both factual data and opinion responses are arranged statistically in percentage graphs, making it possible to appraise quickly a church's comparative score on a particular variable.

These comparative statistics impressively indicate the important differences that exist not only in the characteristics of the members and their degrees of knowledge about the church's goals, but also the different degrees to which members take account of the neighborhood and see the church as having some responsibility to it. This graphic arrangement of the data does not, of course, take the required next step and demonstrate any of the possible interesting relationships among variables as, for example, between class status or ethnicity of members and their evaluations of the total church program. Each graph is accompanied by an interpretative section in which the author makes "editorial comments." For the most part, the comments are *ad hoc* explanations unrelated to theory or relevant publications in the field. The style of these interpretations may be illustrated from his explanation of one congregation that felt the pastor spends "too much" time or "too little" time doing office work. In Kloetzli's words, this is "probably due to the fact that a lower-class group tends to be unappreciative and hostile towards 'paper work'."

Kloetzli's entire contribution is handicapped by his failure to make explicit his concept of "effectiveness" and to specify the indicators for it. Consequently, the reader is left with the task of arriving at the author's underlying ideas of effectiveness. Presumably he favors a church that is directed outward to the neighborhood or community. This outreach is symbolized by making the problems of the area (drink, drugs, delinquency, etc.) a major focus of the members' energies and of the religious program. Hence an effective church is one that is involved in the parish area, recognizes its responsibilities to newcomers, and boasts a membership that is made up

of a random sample of the neighborhood's class and racial groups. I am certain that his more sophisticated readers will not be happy over his summary statement to the effect that the effective church is one that is "responsible, relevant and resourceful." This is not a meaningful statement for either the church leader or the sociologist of religion. But even if we accept these patterns as synonymous with the effective church, the question still to be answered is what makes one congregation more effective than others. Here Kloetzli is not very helpful. In one case, "effectiveness" is the product of a young clergyman's ambitious energies; in another instance "effectiveness" flows from a "tradition of community involvement." In a third church, "effectiveness" comes from "members' attitudes."

In addition to a basic methodological weakness, the book deserves to be criticized on at least two other counts. First, although Kloetzli cannot be held accountable, the questionnaire is less than this reviewer expected. Many of the questions are poorly structured, some seem irrelevant, and many of the response categories are loaded in such a way that the church comes out in a better light than it might have otherwise. Somehow one is not impressed by a question that asks: "During the Sunday worship service, do you find that you pay very close attention to everything that is going on, or does your mind wander to thoughts of other things? (1) Pay very close attention; (2) Pay fairly close attention; (3) Mind wanders; (4) Don't know." Consequently, certain basic inquiries have to be raised about the questionnaire itself: What are these questions measuring? How do the responses, if valid, relate to the problem of church effectiveness? And, how can the questions be interpreted adequately without a more theoretical conception of the church, its objectives, and a formulation of standards for measuring organizational performance?

Secondly, Kloetzli does not find his problem important enough to draw his material together and bring forth a full summary and comparison of the churches as total units. This would have given us an opportunity to see whether the advanced research methods had produced something new and useful.

Glock's essay, "A Sociologist Looks at the Parish Church," defined as an "afterword," is a serious discussion of the church from several perspectives, including the clergyman's role, the implications of the lay leaders' class position on policy and change, the problem of gearing the church to a highly heterogeneous membership, and, finally, the problem of the members' differential involvement in activities. The skeptical reader might find himself asking what relationship the essay has to the study preceding it. There is some suggestion that it might have been added as a kind of rescue attempt. This is left for the reader to decide.

Ivan Vallier, Columbia University

The Open and Closed Mind. By Milton Rokeach. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960. 447 pp., $7.50.

The first impulse, when asked to review this book, was to decline. The reviewer has no special scholarly competence in the psychology of prejudice; and he has long nurtured, he confesses, a kind of "prejudice" against much that is written on the subject—and, indeed, against the term itself. But a preliminary scanning of this volume suggested that it might involve a welcome departure from the usual stereotyped approaches to the subject.

For scientific and scholarly purposes, the trouble with the term *prejudice* is that it, too, involves a prejudgment and is question-begging. Once the label of "prejudice" has been attached to a bit of behavior or belief, and a decision has been made to study it as such, a value judgment has already been made involving presuppositions that often go unexamined. Therefore, the concept of "openness" and "closedness" which Rokeach, together with his collaborators (22 of them), employs, both in the title and elsewhere in the book, represents an advance in that it is more neutral and leaves the way open for a more genuinely functional analysis of the issues at stake.

The difficulty which now arises, of course, is the tendency to assume that openness and willingness to change are good and that the reverse is necessarily bad. Again the author displays prudence and discernment when he says:

> We do not think that this way of making the distinction is very helpful because it does not leave room for the possibility that there may be different varieties of change and resistance to change. For example, there is a difference between rigidity and stability, between intellectual conviction and dogmatic conviction, between party-line change and a more genuine change [p. 10].

Although facing in the right direction, this analysis nevertheless overlooks two important considerations: namely, that in point of fact it very often *is* important what one believes, and that frequently there is no very good way to distinguish truth and sound practice from error except by ongoing experience, which is to say "hindsight." Take this example: The liberal, "progressive," nondogmatic Protestant denominations have been "open" to Freudian psychoanalysis in a way which the more conservative, fundamentalist, "closed" denominations have not been. Which were the wiser? This reviewer believes history will show, decisively, that the latter were. The former, for the best motives imaginable, were simply "open" to the wrong thing!

This, it seems, is a problem to which there is no completely satisfactory solution. One simply has to decide whether one would rather have

a relatively closed belief system and perhaps miss out on a good thing now and then, or have an open belief system and run the risk of being occasionally duped. There was a time a few years back when the only type of error in statistical inference or data interpretation which was recognized involved drawing a conclusion (reaching a decision, "closing" one's mind) when the data did not "really" warrant it; but we have of late realized that it is also possible to be *too* skeptical, *too* unbelieving, refusing to draw an inference which, subsequently, proves to be eminently sound.

Personally, the reviewer does not see how any amount of research, or logical or psychological analysis, is going to resolve this difficulty; and it is surely significant that there is today a sharp upswing of interest in the study of *values* and (especially in sociology) in the problem of personal *identity* (knowing who one is and what one stands for). A general criticism of the Rokeach volume is that it does not go far enough in recognizing these trends. The book is, however, at least suggestive on this score and brings together a number of useful empirical studies. As the author himself concedes, his book makes no claim to theoretical or systematic elegance.

O. Hobart Mowrer, University of Illinois

The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion. By O. Hobart Mowrer. New York: Van Nostrand, 1961. 264 pp., $1.95. Paper.

The thesis of this book is, that "neither Protestant theology nor Freudian psychology is at all adequate to the needs of deeply guilty people and that we must instead seek and utilize the power of human community and good deeds, rather than ignore and despise them." Mowrer says that both psychoanalysis and Protestantism reduce man to a state of helplessness, the latter in terms of his need for redemption and the former in both redemption and responsibility for sin. Consequently, Mowrer scores both psychoanalysis and modern Protestantism for not taking sin as personal wrong-doing seriously. Confession of sin and the acceptance of moral responsibility for restitution and forgiveness of those against whom man has offended are the key to effective therapy.

However, the very word "therapy" itself implies a "sickness" concept of behavior which Mowrer challenges on the basis of its underlying presupposition. The person's distress is a bad conscience which needs enlightenment, confession, and repentance. To think of him as "sick" and in need of "therapy" is to avoid these moral issues rather than to face them. Mowrer scores psychoanalysts for *denying* and not just avoiding these moral dimensions of emotional disorders. He says that pastoral counseling has been at

best only "half-hearted" about the confession of sin and in most instances has "sold out" to psychoanalysis for "a mess of psychological pottage."

Mowrer has reiterated here in polemical fashion a point of view which he has stated both more clearly and with less animus in his book *Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics* (1950). The present volume is a series of lectures. They suffer from having been published *as* lectures given to a listening audience rather than having been carefully rewritten for publication as a book for a reading audience. For example, the semantic mistakes in the author's use of words such as "everything" could have been rewritten. It is a good "sweep of oratory" to say to a cultured audience: "The New Testament, to say nothing of the Old, seems fairly to cry out in opposition to everything which psychoanalysis stands for." But this does not recognize the "wholesale" and "broadside" character of the statement itself.

Herein rest the limitation and weakness of the book. Mowrer's own disillusionment with a form of treatment seems to contribute much too heavily to his polemic, thereby destroying the clear focus and aim of much valuable insight and critical intelligence he has to offer in his book. Many of us, for example, have done our share to emphasize the neglected religious and moral dimensions of distressed and guilt-ridden persons. We have persistently pointed to the weakness in Protestant handling of the problem of guilt. We have called attention to the uncritical use of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis as a field certainly has become uncritical of itself in too many instances, particularly among persons who "dabble" in it as a form of belief. A real confrontation is past due.

But Mowrer writes in a mood of isolation. He tends to equate psychiatry and psychoanalysis, and seems to be more protective of the field of clinical psychology than the direct encounter with clinical psychology justifies. One doubts, for instance, that there has been the wholesale defection from psychoanalytic influences among psychiatrists and psychologists Mowrer asserts (p. 134).

At those points where Mowrer is specific and detailed in his discussion of the value-structure of the guilt-ridden he is usually speaking in terms of his older, more valuable contributions and is most helpful. At those points where he becomes more polemic, he becomes at the same time less specific, uses dangerously broad generalizations, and speaks with a vindictiveness and rancor which should be taken into consideration as one decides to accept or reject the degree of truth there may be in what he says.

Wayne E. Oates, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

An American Dialogue. By Robert McAfee Brown and Gustave Weigel, S. J. New York: Doubleday, 1960. 216 pp., $2.95.

The campaign (and victory) of a Catholic candidate for president of the United States has intensified a recently awakened interest in' problems of church and state, and Protestant-Catholic relations. Witness the appearance of such works as *Facing Protestant-Roman Catholic Tensions,* edited by Cowan; *Roman Catholicism and the American Way of Life,* edited by McAvoy; *The Catholic Viewpoint on Church and State,* by Kerwin; and the reticent Murray's first book, *We Hold These Truths*: *Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition. An American Dialogue* is a distinguished contribution to this list. Its value as a symbol of inter-religious engagement is enhanced with an incisive foreword by the Jewish theologian and sociologist, Herberg.

The purpose of *An American Dialogue,* indicated in its subtitle, "A Protestant looks at Catholicism and a Catholic looks at Protestantism," is really twofold. The authors, Brown, a Protestant, and Weigel, a Catholic, are concerned to interpret each other's religious confession to their fellow-believers in a manner which avoids the usual simplistic stereotypes, while pointing out the genuine convictions and criticisms that divide them. Although their approach and interest are principally theological, the authors are aware of nontheological factors underlying the character of Protestantism and Catholicism in America. Brown, e.g., brings out the historical and sociological forces which produced resentment, isolation, and misunderstanding in the two groups. Weigel admits the diversities in worldwide Roman Catholicism, but upholds its consistency against the tendency of Protestantism to become a slightly more pious reflection of the culture in which it finds itself.

The realism of this book should be noted. Neither author assumes that Protestantism and Roman Catholicism will be united in the foreseeable future; nor do they hesitate to accentuate their apparently insoluble differences. This is a new kind of dialogue, one which avoids the saccharine quest for a common-denominator faith untrue to the integrity of either. Both Brown and Weigel find, however, in the ecumenical movement a renewed interest in dialogue and a stimulus to objective studies of each other's thought and history, of which this book itself is a helpful example. It appears at a time when many quiet but uninhibited conversations are taking place between Protestants and Catholics.

Like the "Great Debates," the Brown-Weigel dialogue lacks vigorous clash on specific issues. On the key problem, authority, Weigel's understanding of Protestantism does not come close to Brown's, whose definition of authority would, as a matter of fact, find little support among liberal, middle-class Protestant churches. But there is much time for

ironing out this and other misunderstandings. The two essays, as they now stand, despite their brevity and informality, are among the best published statements in which American spokesmen for the two groups purport to examine themselves and each other. They contrast sharply with the irrationality and cries of "bigot" we have also heard in 1960. If such dialogue continues, Protestants and Catholics may be on their way toward a coexistence in which strong and diverse religious convictions do not inhibit acceptance, understanding, and cooperation on mutual social objectives.

Tom Sanders, Brown University

The German Phoenix. By Franklin Hamlin Littell. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960. xv + 226 pp., $3.95.

This book, subtitled "Men and Movements in the Church in Germany," is a fascinating account of the rise of the *Kirchentag* and Lay Academies in post-Hitlerian Germany. Few people could be better qualified to tell this story to Americans than Dr. Littell, who spent almost ten years in Germany after the war as chief Protestant adviser to the U.S. High Commissioner, and who has himself been active in the work of both the phenomena he describes.

Germany emerged from World War II utterly crushed militarily, economically, geographically, and (apparently) spiritually. How was it possible for the church to emerge out of this situation with the new vitality, direction, and energy that have been evident on a world-wide scale since 1945? This is the question Dr. Littell's book seeks to answer.

He begins by reminding us of the resistance to Hitler that was continued by the churches during World War II and that goes back to the prophetic Barmen Declaration of 1934—an utterance that will surely endure as one of the high points of modern church history. To be sure, there were defectors, and there were witnesses whose faith was weak, but the maturing of the German churches through these years of trial is indicated not only by the roll of martyrs who died for their faith, but also by the Stuttgart Declaration of 1945, in which leaders of the German church confessed *their* guilt for the reign of Hitler and "identified themselves with the sin of their own people."

Two notable movements of religious and sociological significance emerged in post-war Germany. The first has been the *Kirchentag*, the laymen's rallies held annually (and now biennially in alteration to similar Roman Catholic Congresses) in cities of both West and East Germany, where hundreds of thousands of Christians meet to discuss the relevance of their faith to their own situation (chap. 4). The other expression has been the "evangelical acad-

emies," centers for discussion by small groups, both Christian and non-Christian, of their responsibility in the world today (chap. 5; cf. the variety of discussion topics listed on pp. 127-130). These two descriptive chapters, along with chapter 1, make the most vivid impression upon the reader.

Dr. Littell concludes by asking what can Americans learn from these experiments (chap. 6), and warns against the hope of facile transplanting to the American scene. He feels that there are particular possibilities for revitalization through the American university campuses.

The book also includes valuable appendices, including "The Platform of the German Christians" (i.e., those who cooperated with Hitler), the texts of the Barmen and Stuttgart Declarations, and other material dealing directly with the lay academies themselves.

Robert McAfee Brown, Union Theological Seminary

The Suburban Captivity of the Churches. By Gibson Winter. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961. 216 pp., $3.50.

This book presents an analysis of Protestantism and the dilemma in which its leaders find themselves as they try to develop a strategy for serving the emerging metropolis. The writer thinks that present denominational policies based on congregationally controlled local churches are not adequate bases for confronting the church with its total responsibility for the metropolis. Gibson Winter, Assistant Professor in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, has made an analysis of the church and its "place in society" that should be given careful attention by all persons in positions of church leadership.

The author points out that in earlier generations most persons were self-employed; the church therefore had a direct influence on business since church members were also "businessmen." The industrial revolution has changed the employment pattern, particularly in the metropolis, so that church members are now recruited almost entirely from the ranks of job-holders who depend on others to provide jobs. Propertyless management teams have replaced the little businessman. The church gradually was isolated from the basic decision-making processes inherent in the business and political processes.

The author traces the implication of this process for the church. As the denominational church ceased to serve all interests of a "natural" community the doctrine of the church subtly changed until the parish was described as referring to the "community of residence," reflecting the social-class structure of its residential community.

The author looks to some of the newer types of special ministries for guidance out of the dilemma. A "sector ministry" would tend to confront the church with the inclusive needs of the whole metropolis as it attempts to speak responsibly to all of society.

Some readers will wish for a chance to "talk back" to Winter and obtain a more detailed statement of the presuppositions that underlie his analysis of the church. References to the ethnic communities of the latter part of last century as "natural" communities hint that the Protestant church has a "golden past" in the light of which it is not measuring up today. The writer speaks as an onlooker and not as a participant in church planning, and some of the criticism of present suburban church policies is influenced by his personal view of the economics of church administration. On such judgments will hinge much of the controversy over Winter's analysis.

Not so easily answered, however, is his analysis of the gradual isolation of religious relevance of the church from the decision-making processes of community life.

The author's suggestions of how the church can be "put back" into a "context of responsibility" should have careful consideration by every thoughtful churchman.

Richard A. Myers, Church Federation of Greater Chicago

The Pulpit and the Plow. By Ralph A. Felton. New York: Friendship Press, 1960. 168 pp., $2.95.

Ralph Felton is one of the great men of the rural life movement of the first half of our century. This reviewer first saw his footprints on the Danby Hills in Tompkins County, New York, where from a geographically impossible situation he had brought together the people of nine churches into the Tobey Larger Parish; that was thirty years ago, and it is working yet. So is Ralph Felton.

The book is characteristic of his spirit. Taking little credit for himself, he begins with a long list of acknowledgements—the class rolls of several seminars, one may guess. His genius has always been to involve others, to activate people, to set them to work and then, once they have been committed, to slip on quietly and to break another fallow.

This particular writing is unusually characteristic because it runs over, in brief, almost his entire philosophy and teaching career. Here is the harvest of his seminar research, here is the fruit of his meditation, here are clippings from his talks. Here are the problems of rural life as he has

seen them, here are the answers as they have been worked out over the past years. And here is the feeling that they are good answers still.

Probably, in many parts of the world, this is true. These would be the places where hand tools scratch at thin soil and dull minds rout under-nourished bodies out at dawn. There is room for the agricultural mission-ary and the farmer-organization preacher, and Felton makes a good case for them.

And yet in our own country, better methods of breeding and tilling have filled storage bins with rotting food, and farm organizations have be-come bitter crusaders for the selfish interests of farmers. Man's struggle with nature is on the verge of being won, but his struggle with himself has hardly begun. It is not enough to replace the diseases of malnutrition with those of over-eating. Kwashiorkor is an ugly disease, but cancer and arteri-osclerosis are no prettier. The gospel of the "better life" is good, but what of the "affluent society"? How can the one be stopped from becoming the other?

These questions are not answered in this book, nor are they raised. Strangely, and without the author's intent, that is one of the good things about it. One closes it with a nostalgic mood, as if driving away from a family reunion at the old home place, across the road from which an elec-tronics factory has begun operation. "It was good," one says with a sigh. And then accelerates with the quickening traffic.

William G. Mather, Pennsylvania State University

Ferment on the Fringe. By Shirley E. Greene. Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1960. 174 pp., $2.00.

This book by Shirley Greene, Secretary of Town and Country Church for the Evangelical and Reformed Church, reports on ten churches of this denomination.

Prior to the actual case studies are two summary chapters: "Secrets of Success" and "About Attitudes." Conclusions would have been clearer had they followed rather than preceded the presentation of data. The book ends suddenly with the tenth report; a concluding chapter would have im-proved one's intellectual digestion. Students of sociology of religion will find a number of intriguing hypotheses presented in the two summary chapters but the data from the ten cases are too meager to do more than illustrate them.

In seeking a similar publication in the literature one's mind goes back to *The Country Church as It Is,* by Myers and Sundt, published in 1930 by Revell. Those authors studied promising, somewhat promising, and inef-

fective churches. Some such choice covering a wider spectrum would have made *Ferment on the Fringe* more valuable. There is indeed variation among these churches: their memberships ranged from 66 to 547 in 1950, and from 106 to 851 in 1958; the average membership was 246 in 1950 and 448 in 1958; the average church increased 82 per cent in the eight years but the lowest rate of increase was 15 per cent and the highest 308 per cent. Nevertheless, they were all on the up side. They cannot be related to the nation or denomination or even to the sixty churches from which these cases were selected. A cursory analysis of yearbook data for the sixty would have helped to relate the ten to a wider universe. Like so many studies here is tantalizing material difficult to assimilate to the body of research and teaching because there is no way of determining to what it relates or what it represents.

When the churches are arrayed by membership they tend to maintain the same relative position in 1958 that they held in 1950. One conspicuous exception is Hawker at Knollwood, Ohio, which jumped from fourth place in 1950 to eighth place in 1958. This numerically outstanding church illustrates the identification of the church with middle-class culture. One citizen says: "We are not trying to be a city; we are trying to avoid being a city." A church official makes it even more explicit: "We moved out here to get away from the city and the kind of people who live in that kind of housing area; and we are not about to let them into Beaver Township" (p. 94). The pastor of this particular church is credited with being the inspiration of this volume. The author in the first chapter writes: "This is not a study of illness; it is a study of health." But Pastor Immel, of Hawker Church, replies: "When is someone going to take a look at our situation and give us some guidance?" Shirley Greene has looked at Hawker Church and called it good, but his data do not permit one to determine how good or good for what.

Rockwell C. Smith, Garrett Biblical Institute

Methodism's Challenge in Race Relations. By J. Philip Wogaman. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 76 pp., $2.00. Paper.

This work examines the role of the Methodist Church in race relations. It makes use of much unpublished materials. The paucity of material in the realm of social-action strategy for churches has been greatly aided by the appearance of this volume. Interestingly enough, the majority of discussions on strategy have been of a military nature. This treatment takes the theories of social science and applies them to an area of human relations in which Mr. Wogaman, a Methodist minister, is personally involved.

This volume was subsidized by the student body of the Boston University School of Theology and donated to the members of the 1960 General Conference in the hope that they would act with more asperity than their preliminary report on race in the organizatin of the church indicated. The principles of desegregation outlined in this volume are applied at the local church level, but of general interest is the direct way in which it is suggested that administrators might support those ministers and church leaders who are conscientiously attempting to aid desegregation.

The author's bold suggestion of a plan for the elimination of the Central Jurisdiction of the Methodist Church included such step-by-step outlines as (1) an evaluation of the arguments for its retention on the part of Central Jurisdiction delegates, (2) a weighing of the arguments of the separate-but-equal delegates, (3) the establishment of goals of desegregation, (4) methods of transferring property and recognizing the rights and vested interests of the Central Jurisdiction, and (5) specific legislation to effect the change.

The weakness of this volume is that of much of our research: the lack of experience. The author sees the problem clearly at the theoretical level but neglects the political realm. There is much of the one-party system dilemma that should have been considered in this research. There is much more of the political nature involved in the disfranchisement of the Negro Methodist which militates against the elimination of the troublesome jurisdiction. The several levels of conversation, the endless hours of "waiting it out" which characterize labor relations, and the endless patience needed to enable people to see the need for change are not given their proportionate space in this volume. Perhaps they could not be included. One cannot discuss them dispassionately. There are few people in the church who would disagree with Wogaman's goals. Few Methodist leaders want the Central Jurisdiction continued indefinitely. The problem which liberal leadership confronts is almost entirely one of timing. The wonder is that the goals have been agreed upon!

Despite the area of omission, this volume can aid greatly in the continuing development of Protestant strategy in areas of human relations. The specific steps which have been developed in this dissertation should be of value and serve as new information to leaders in religious research and action.

Herbert Stotts, Boston University School of Theology

The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941. By Donald B. Meyer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. 482 pp., $6.75.

Even the casual student of recent American Protestant social thought knows that its two greatest heroes are Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold

Niebuhr. One was the supreme prophet of the social-gospel idealism which burned so fiercely during the first four decades of the century; the other is the chief spokesman for the tough-minded yet sensitive Christian realism which has replaced that idealism in sophisticated theological circles. Donald B. Meyer, Associate Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles, has done a splendid job of describing the development from piety to pragmatism, from the vision of an ideal end to concern about the necessity for choosing from morally dubious means, from a passion for wholesale social reconstruction to a rueful acknowledgment of the ambiguities of human selfhood, that characterizes the period under examination.

The first duty of the scholar is to cover the available sources thoroughly, and it is apparent from Meyer's references to obscure committee reports, long-forgotten convention statements, and editorials in the organs of defunct organizations that he has performed this serivce painstakingly. It is also apparent that he is able to relate all of these data meaningfully to the events in the secular world which provided the context for the rise and fall of the social gospel. In short, he avoids both confusion and dullness in his use of an impeccably scholarly approach: the analytical framework is always clear and usually persuasive; the style is notable for its epigrammatic bite and for its ability to breathe life into the whole drama. The two major figures are portrayed with admirable faithfulness—it is gratifying to see Rauschenbusch so judiciously handled after the shameful abuses to which he has been subjected by many less careful critics of the social gospel—and some of the lesser figures are fascinatingly drawn, too, especially Harry Ward and A. J. Muste.

One could, of course, dispute the interpretation given of certain individual churchmen; for example, one might contend that John Bennett (who is termed an apostle of "neoliberalism") has been damned with faint praise. More important, one could argue that Meyer has glossed over several crucial questions in his rather uncritical acceptance of the sufficiency of the Niebuhrian position. It is by no means certain that the prophets of the social gospel were guilty of the *hybris* which Meyer attributes to them, or that their stress on the importance of human effort was as misguided as some of the particular programs they espoused. Nor is it clear that neo-orthodoxy's emphasis on tragic ambiguity and authentic selfhood is capable of providing all the resources that are needed for an adequate response to the *kairos* which confronts American Christians today.

On the whole, though, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism* is an excellent contribution to our understanding of one of the truly decisive struggles taking place within the thought and action of contemporary Protestantism.

Henry Clark, Yale University